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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE CF UTAH 
----------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
vs 
CITY CF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 19186 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATEMENT Of THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the claimed (the trial court found otherwise) 
"unreasonableness" of a municipal "impact fee" assessed and collected 
from land developers within the City of West Jordan as a condition of 
subdivision development approval; the facial constitutionality of the 
"impact fee" ordinance has been previously upheld by decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
This appeal presents the following issue: whether or not the trial 
court, following presentation of the Plaintiffs' evidence, properly 
dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims and entered judgment in favor of the 
Defendant by reason of the Plaintiffs' failure to prove, by a 
perponderance of the evidence, their claims, including that the "impact 
fee" assessed against them was "unreasonable." 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In 1978 the Plaintiffs filed this litigation to challenge the 
constitutionality of a ordinance which provided that an "impact fee" be 
paid by land-developers (subdividers). In 1979 the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the facial constitutionality of the "impact fee" ordinance. Call vs 
City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). [Hereinafter "Call 
I"] However, following Plaintiffs' petition for rehearing, the Supreme 
Court in 1980 remanded the case for trial in the district court on the 
issue of whether the impact fee assessed against the Plaintiffs was 
"reasonable". Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 
1980). [Hereinafter "Call II"] 
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In November 1981, following the de11i;, I hy JrHlq<' ll~11ks 1 of 
Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class action certif1cat 10n, the PJ;ii11t i ffs 
filed an interlocutory appeal on the class action issues. SuprPme Court 
Docket No. 18098. That interlocutory appeal was denied without formal 
opinion. December 8, 1981. 
Thereafter the Plaintiffs filed an original proceedrng 1n the Supreme 
Court seeking a writ of mandamus against the Honorable Jay E Banks, 
Judge of the Third District Court, requiring hlm to enter formal findings 
concerning his refusal to certify the class action. Supreme Court Docket 
No. 18217. This Court denied to issue the writ of mandamus. February 10, 
1982. 
In December 1982 the trial court, following presentation of 
Plaintiffs' evidence, dismissed Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the 
Plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain their burden 
of proof. [The "Memorandum Decision" of the trial court is attached as 
Appendix "A", herein.] 
FACTS 
The Plaintiffs ignore and gloss over the material facts involved in 
this case. It is necessary for the Court to ex amine those facts to fully 
appreciate these issues. 
The City of West Jordan [hereinafter referred to as "City"], present 
population of about 30,000, is located in the southwestern quarter of Salt 
Lake County. In the mid-1970's the City became concerned with the problems 
associated with the tremendous growth which was occurring within the city 
limits. Record at 1533-1538. 
Previously unimproved farmlands were transformed into residential 
subdivisions. The City's population grew from 4000 in 1970 to 27 ,000 in 
1980. That growth brought two problems. First, the increased population 
placed increased demands upon existing recreational facilit1es. Secondly, 
the improvement of the previously-unimproved farmlands increased the 
flood-control problem. 
In the mid-1970's, the City Planning and Zoning Commission regularly 
required developers to "donate" to the City "green areas". Such "yreen 
areas" were to be reserved for recreational uses and parks. These 
donations were based upon a percentage of land-area developed; the 
percentage ranged from 5% to 10?;. This practice was done on an informal 
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ilR'il'i; that is, it was voluntary on the part of the developer and not 
basPd upon an actual ordinance adopted by the City Council. See Record at 
Vi 3 \_ 1 s 58' 1648-16 73. 
In 1974, the City Council commissioned the engineering firm of 
Nielsen, Maxwell & Wangsgard of Salt Lake City to undertake a study of the 
City's flood-control needs and methods to solve those needs. The 
engineering study culminated in the thirty-five page document, "Master 
Storm Drainage Plan for the City of West Jordan, Utah", dated November 
1974. [Exhibit D-7) See also Record at 1563-1569. 
In 1975 the City Council adopted the present "impact fee" ordinance. 
The Ordinance requires the developers of land to donate to the City seven 
percent of the value of the land developed to the City. The money so 
developed is utilized for flood-control and recreation purposes. The 
City adopted a solution involving facilities called "detention basins." 
These "basins" were to be strategically located throughout the community. 
Some basins were engineered to be able to accomodate the run-off water 
from more than one stiJdivision. Into these basins would be routed the 
run-off water collected from the individual subdivisions. The run-off 
water would accumulate in the basin immediately following a storm, but 
would thereafter be allowed to "trickle off" at a controlled 
rate---through existing storm lines---following the storm. The reduced 
flow could be safely released into adjoining "receiving waters" (such as a 
canal, a creek, or the Jordan River) without adversely creating a problem 
for everyone downhill and downstream. The "basins" would be improved: 
grass would be planted and recreation equipment (swings, slides, picnic 
tables, etc.) would be located in the basin for use by the public at "good 
weather" times. 
Under the "impact fee" ordinance, approximately $525,000 was 
collected from developers. This money was placed into a special account 
(the "flood control" account) within the "General Fund" of the City. 
Although over the years the account numbers of this "flood control" 
account were changed to reflect changes in the sophistication of the 
City's accounting controls, the actual concept of the special account did 
not change. From the "flood control" account the City expended 
approximately $1,200,000 for capital expenditures for flood-control and 
for parks and recreation projects. Evidence adduced at trial, even from 
Plaintiffs' own witness, showed that none of the $1,200,000 in 
expenditures went for items other than the capital projects for 
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flood-control, parks and recreation, as spec if 1 erl 111 I 1,,, I Jr rl 1 11ci11cio lHlop I Pd 
in 1975. [See specifically the trial court's Frnrlrnqs II 7, 8, 'I, 1 IJ, <rnd 
11, included herein as Appendix "8", and the RPrnrrl at 1f>Cl1-1t,9') arid 
1746-1749. See also Exhibit D-4.) 
In February 1977---at Plaintiffs' request---the Plaintiffs' properly 
was annexed into the City. In July 1977 the Plaintiffs pa id an "impact 
fee" of $16,576 as a condition to develop a 30-acre, 96-single-famlly 
dwelling unit residential subdivision, the "Wescall Subdivision", in the 
City. 
ARGUMENT 
POI NT I 
THE "REASONABLENESS" OF THE "IMPACT FEE" ASSESSED 
IS THE ~LY ISSUE TO BE DECIDED 
This Court in Call I has already upheld the facial constitutionality 
of the City's "impact fee" ordinance. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). That 
facial constitutionality was reaffirmed in the Call II decision. 614 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1980). However, in Call II, the the case was remanded for 
trial to determine---at Plaintiffs' request---the sole issue of the "as 
applied" constitutionality of the assessed fee. Justice Wilkins, writing 
for a unanimous court, wrote: 
In this case the rule adopted by this Court in Call I, 
quoted ante, cannot be applied without plaintiffs being given 
the opportunity to present evidence to show that the dedication 
required of them had no reasonable relationship to the needs for 
flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by 
their subdivision •• 
614 P.2d at 1259. Emphasis added. 
Notwithstanding the explicit rulings of this Court in both Call I and 
Call II and the clear direction as to the limited issue reserved for trial 
following remand, the Plaintiffs still are asserting that the "impact fee" 
ordinance is "unconstitutional" on its face. 
Certainly the doctrine of "the law of the case" prevents a 
re-examination of these issues. That "doctrine" st ates that once a case 
has been adjudicated and appealed, the law as announced by the appellate 
court [this Court) ought to be followed for all subsequent proceedings in 
I 11<Jl 1 ;ic;P. lhe rurpose of the doctrine has been articulated by this Court 
in the case of Richardson vs Grand Central Corporation, 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 
l'l77l, in li1ich the Court wrote: 
The purpose of the doctrine of "the law of the case" is that 
in the interest of economy of time and efficiency of procedure, 
it is desirable to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in 
repetitious contentions and rulings upon the same proposition in 
the same case. 
572 P.2d at 397. Emphasis added. 
Certainly the Plaintiffs' continual claims of the invalidity of the 
"impact fee" ordinance---when the constitutionality of the ordinance has 
been already upheld TWICE by this Court in this case involving these SAME 
PLAINTIFFS---are "repetitious contentions" which the doctrine seeks to 
avoid. The decisions of this Court in Call I and Call II must be held to 
be binding upon the Plaintiffs, especially when they challenged, in a 
declaratory judgment action, the validity of the "impact fee" ordinance 
under a nlJTlber of theories. The Court has ruled that the ordinance was 
valid and constitutional. To allow the Plaintiffs to re-litigate those 
issues or to inject new issues (which should have been filed originally in 
the declaratory judgment action in 1978) is patently wasteful of precious 
judicial resources; this "Johnny come lately" approach cannot be 
countenanced. Otherwise, there will be no end to this litigation. 
The Plaintiffs rely heavily on this Court's decision in the case of 
Banberry Development Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 
1981), decided after Call I and Call II were announced. This Court, in 
Banberry, made it absolutely clear what the issues were to be in THIS 
LITIGATION, when the Court wrote: 
In Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979), 
on rehearing 614 P.2d 1257 (1980), this Court upheld the 
validity of a city ordinance that required subdividers, as a 
condition of pl at approval, to dedicate certain proposed 
subdivision land to the city ••.. In remanding the case for 
trial on the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied 
••• , this Court ruled that "the dedication should have some 
reasonable relationship to the need created by the 
subdivision." 
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. 
The "reasonableness" of the "impact fee", "as applied" against the 
present Plaintiffs, is the sole issue for determination in this case. The 
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to re-litigate issues previously decided, 
even if those issues are somewhat disguised to mask their true character. 
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On the "reasonableness" issue, the f'l~lfllltts wPrP "q1vpri tlw 
opportunity to resent evidence" to show the impact fpp dSSP'i'iP<1 ;,qa1nst 
them was "unreasonable." The November 18, 1982 t nal was that 
"opportunity." THE PLAINTIFFS PRESENTlD NO EVIDENL'l DN !Hf l'>SlJf. 
Accordingly, the trial court, upon timely motion by the Defendant, 
dismissed Plaintiffs' claims, held that the Plaintiffs had failed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence their claims, and held that "no 
cause of action had been shown", and that judgment should be entered in 
favor of the Defendant. [See the trial court's "Memorandum Decis10n" 
(Appendix "A", herein) and the discussion at Point II, below.) 
POI NT I I 
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN TO SHOW 
THAT THE IMPACT FEE WAS UNREASONABLE 
As indicated above, the issue reserved for trial by the Supreme Court 
was the"reasonableness" of the "impact fee" assessed against the 
Plaintiffs. 
The Plaintiffs HAVE BEEN GIVEN the "opportunity to present evidence" 
concerning the "unreasonableness" of the West Jordan "impact fee". The 
November 18, 1982 trial was that "opportunity." THE PLAINTIFFS PRESENTED 
ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE to show that the fee was unreasonable. This lack of 
evidence was predicted by Mr DeBry, counsel for the Plaintiffs, prior to 
the beginning of the presentation of his evidence. He remarked: 
Your Honor, our case this morning will be very short. It's the 
only case in my career that I remember where the testimony will 
be shorter than the opening statement. 
Emphasis added. Record at p. 1716. 
Plaintiffs' only evidence presented was the testimony of the 
accountant, Mr. Sharkey. His twenty minutes of testimony [Record at 
1720-1765.) can be summarized as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
I am a certified public accountant and I have examined the West 
Jordan City records and exhibits previously admitted in this 
case. The aforementioned examination took approximately 23 
hours. I also heard the testimony of the City's witnesses at 
the September 1st and 2nd evidentiary hearing. On the basis of 
my examination of the records and the exhibits admitted into 
evidence and the testimony of the City's witnesses from the 
September 1st and 2nd hearing. I am unable to formulate an 
opinion as to whether or not the monies collected pursuant to 
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t hP f loorl lont rol Impact Fee Ordinance of West Jordan from the 
prr-,,ent f'laintifFs were expended for flood control and parks 
purpnSP"3. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
I found no evidence to show that any of the fees collected and 
deposited into the "flood control" account of the general fund 
were utilized for anything other than capital expenditures for 
flood control and parks and recreation area projects. I found 
no records indicating that expenditures were made for improper 
purposes. The City records, indicated that the fund balance in 
the flood control account was zeroed out each year at the end of 
the fiscal year. The City records showed that the City 
collected from developers approximately $525,000 pursuant to 
the" impact fee" ordinance and deposited the same in the "flood 
control" account; the City records showed that the City expended 
from the flood control account within the general fund 
approximately $1,200,000 for capital projects for flood control 
and parks and recreation areas. 
Mr. Sharkey' s testimony---at least as the same can be utilized for 
persuasive evidence for Plaintiffs' assertions--- can be summarized to a 
single sentence: 
I am unable to formulate an opinion. 
The Plaintiffs have had the "opportunity to present evidence" to show 
that there was "no reasonable relationship" between the "impact fee" 
paid and the needs their subdivision created. The trial court was correct 
in ruling that this evidence did not show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the West Jordan Ordinance was "unreasonable." 
The trial court complied with this Court's directive (i.e. to give 
the Plaintiffs an "opportunity to present evidence"). The Plaintiffs did 
not produce one recreation expert to testify. The Plaintiffs themselves 
(Mr John Call and Mr Clark Jenkins)---allegedly so aggrieved by the 
alleged unconstitutional application of the ordinance---did not testify!! 
Mr. Sharkey, the accountant, openly acknowledge that he was not an expert 
in these other disciplines and could give no testimony on those related 
issues. Record at 1764. 
The Plaintiffs' sole evidence is the testimony of Mr. Sharkey 
concerning his inability to formulate an opinion. Had Plaintiffs truly 
been interested in proving the "unreasonableness" of the "impact fee", 
they could have hired an engineer to testify concerning the 
"unreasonableness" of that "impact fee." This the Plaintiffs did not do. 
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In his opening statement prior t ,J t lw i'r' .,, ,t ;t 1 
DeBry acknowledged to the court: 
Now, we still have the burden of µPr·..;ua'.:;trm. wP've ql1t to 
persuade the court. But what we have to •he t" pPrs,,;idc- I lip 
court with is their evidence. We've s1mplv qot t<i look"' lliP1r 
records and their documents and their minutes, ;inalvzr, t t1;il <rnd 
use that material to persuade the courl. Then it brings u,3 down 
to our witnesses today, your honor. Our evidence will be very 
short. I have a certified public accountant who will take the 
stand. He will testify that he looked at all of their evidence, 
he has heard the evidence in the trial, he's looked at the 
exhibits, and he cannot form any conclusions, that based on the 
evidence they've given us, based on their own financial records, 
he cannot answer the questions set out by the Banberry court. 
Record at pp. 1719-1720. Emphasis added. 
The Defendants rely significantly upon the Master's Report. Yet the 
Master's Report was only A PRELIMINARY REPORT .[The preparation of the 
"final report" was expressly waived by the Plaintiffs. Record at 760.] In 
that Master's Report the Master himself realized that he would have to DO 
MORE THAN MERELY EXAMINE THE CITY'S ACCOUNTING RECORDS. Page 2 of the 
Master's Report [Exhibit 25] contains the following statement: 
Since the information is not provided in the accounting 
records, it will have to come from other records and again from 
the help of a trained engineer. 
Emphasis added. It is interesting to wonder where Plaintiffs assumed that 
the "accounting records" MUST show the "reasonableness" of the "impact 
fee". Call I and Call II didn't say that; Benberry didn't say that. Even 
the court-appointed Master---a certified public accountant, not a 
lawyer---recognized that HE WOULD HAVE TO DO MORE THAN LOOK AT THE CITY'S 
ACCOUNTING RECORDS to determine if the fee was "reasonable" or 
"unreasonable." 
Yet the Plaintiffs' approach still continues to be "that it must be 
shown in the accounting records that the fee is 'reasonable' or else the 
City loses". [See the discussion at C, below.] The accounting records of 
the City reflect only monetary items; the do not reflect subjective issues 
such as the "benefits conferred" to a particular subdivis10n. To determine 
those "benefits conferred", one must---as the Master clearly 
indicated---consult with a trained engineer. THIS [HE PLAINTIFFS 010 NOT 
DOI 
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''I 11"' 1 I ts pr1itJ,wp1J hut nrlP witness, Mr. Sharkey, who indicated: 
1. lli;Jt t hP Mast er was correct in his analysis in that the 
1·1ci'.31 Pr would he required to talk to engineers. [Record at 1756] 
Thal he had talkPr1 Io the city engineer "for about ten 
minutes". [Record at 1757] 
3. That he has never observed the Wescall Subdivision. [Record 
at 1763] 
4. That he had no particular expertise concerning the needs 
created by the residents who live in the subdivision, those 
needs being parks and recreation facilities. [Record at 1764] 
5. That he had no way of disputing the engineers testimony and 
analysis concerning run-off created by that subdivision. [Record 
at 1764] 
6. That he had no technical expertise to know what kind of flood 
control problems the subdivision might create. [Record at 1764] 
7. That he had taken much less time to inspect the City's 
records than was actually necessary. 
This last point was correctly keyed upon by Judge Dee, who remarked: 
THE COURT: I understand that in Mr. Sharkey's affidavit 
that it would take 50 to 100 hours and he didn't spend that 
time, he spent 8 hours. 
Record at 1755. 
Obviously the trial court judge was unconvinced by the inadequate 
preparation the Plaintiffs had arranged. The Plaintiffs had failed to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the fee assessed against them was 
"unreasonable". The lack of evidence furnished by the Plaintiffs cannot 
contradict the evidence presented in the September 1982 hearings 
concerning the needs created by the Wescall development. Indeed, 
Plaintiffs' counsel in his opening remarks admitted that he had no 
evidence on these issues. [Record at 1717-1718] 
The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant had failed to comply with 
the pre-trial order of Judge Rigtrup. On the contrary, the trial judge 
(Judge Dee) specifically found that the City had complied with the 
pre-trial order of Judge Rigtrup. Judge Dee stated: 
. I have already ruled on the question whether I 
thought he's complied with Judge Rigtrup's order, and I think he 
has, 
RPcnrd at 1711-1712. Emphasis added. 
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However, the Plaintiffs ignore the bur1JPns pl3c1'd IJPllN THlM hv the 
pre-trial order. The pre-trial order (Paragraph 6' spPr1ficollv prllvided: 
.•• the Plaintiffs shall have the burden of proof with rPspect 
to each matter listed below: 
A. Whether the 7% fee required of Plaintiffs had ;my 
reasonable relationship to the needs for flood 
control, parks and recreation facilities created by 
their sttidivision. (Citation to cases omitted) 
B. Whether the 7% fee has required the newly 
developed properties to bear more than there equitable 
share of capital cost in relation to the benefits 
conferred. (Citation to Benberry case omitted.) . 
Chviously, the Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the pre-trial 
order which recited the obligations which had been imposed upon the 
Plaintiffs by Call II and Benberry. 
All the Plaintiffs presented was testimony concerning the lack of 
documentation within the City records. Mr. Sharkey was unable to express 
an opinion concerning whether or not the City spent the money for the 
projects indicated. Certainly, the inability to express an opinion does 
not prove by a preponderance of evidence that the "impact fee" was not 
spent in the manner the City had claimed. Indeed, by Mr. Sharkey's own 
admission, the City took in approximately $525,000 from developers as 
monies pursuant to the "impact fee" ordinance. During that same ti me the 
City expended almost $1,200,000 for flood control and parks projects. Mr. 
Sharkey admitted that the City's practice was to zero out the account at 
the end of each year. [See Finding No. 10]. Mr. Sharkey testified that 
he uncovered no evidence to show that any expenditures from the "flood 
control account" were made for anything other than the capital 
improvements for parks and recreation projects represented by the numerous 
exhibits. Finding No. 11] 
Certainly the inability to express an opinion would perhaps be 
critical if the City had spent LESS on such projects than it took in from 
developers. But that is not the case here; the City spent MORE---hundreds 
or thousands of dollars more---than it took in. This difference was made 
up by a "subsidy" from other general revenue sources of the City. 
[Finding No. 9]. Indeed, the development impact fee assessed against the 
developers, including the Plaintiffs, simply WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE NEEDS CREATED BY THE DEVELOPMENT. [Record at 161 3] 
This, however, does not show that the fee was "unreasonable". If 
anything, it shows that the fee was "more than reason ab 1 e" and that the 
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'1Pv•0 lopPr'o wPrce being subsidized. In actuality they were paying for less 
than 111P true impact they were creating. Certainly the showing made by 
the Plaintiffs was properly understood. 
The City's response was and has always been that it was pooled with 
other monies so as to provide these flood control and parks and recreation 
projects. This pooling has certainly been allowed. In specific response, 
the City purchased the Booth property immediately adjacent to the Wescall 
Subdivision. The purchase of the "Booth Property" was made expressly 
because of the development of the Wescall subdivision and one other 
residential subdivision. See Exhibit 13-D. Testimony was given by Mr. 
Olson that the Wescall residents would require 1.45 acres of additional 
park area. [Record at 1700] The cost for this real estate so purchase at 
$9,000 per acre would be in excess of $13,000. This expenditure was made 
concerning the Booth property in anticipation of the Wescall Subdivision 
being approved the following month. [Record at 1556-1558, 1681, 1684, 
1697, 1700] The $13,000 figure DOES NOT include the capital expenditures 
for the park which may run thousands of dollars more, nor does it include 
any fee concerning the flood-control costs incurred by the Wescall 
development. 
Witnesses testified concerning that the Wescall development would 
increase the run-off into Bingham Creek by 17 cubic feet of water per 
second for every second of duration of the storm. [Record at 1734] 
Certainly the Plaintiffs should be expected to pay for the increased 
run-off created by their development' The Plaintiffs presented no evidence 
even to attack, let alone rebut, the Defendant's evidence presented on 
that point. Indeed, Mr. Sharkey admitted that he had no evidence 
concerning that item. [Record at 1764] 
De fend ant' s witnesses testified that immediately "downstream" (i.e. 
downhill from the Bingham Creek channel, into which the run-off from the 
Wescall Subdivision was discharged) was a residential subdivision which 
was frequently flooded. [Record at 1598-1601] The trial court properly 
Found that Plaintiffs should be held to pay for part of the "impact" (i.e. 
increased run-off which may flood the "downstream" subdivision) the 
Plaintiffs' development created. [Findings Nos. 16 and 17] 
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B 
The Plaintiffs have incorrectly analyzed tl1e burdPn placed upor1 them 
by the Call II decision. The Plaintiffs did not utilize taking "the 
opportunity to present evidence" that the fee "bore no reasonable 
relationship to the needs created by their subdivision." Rather, the 
Plaintiffs claim the burden is upon the Defendant. This improper approach 
can be readily determined by reading the headings for argument in 
Plaintiffs' brief, as discussed in subparagraph C, below. 
This approach (that the "burden is upon the City") totally ignores 
the clear directive of Call II: the case was remanded so that PLAINTIFFS 
COULD SHOW the "impact fee" was "unreasonable". The approach further 
ignores the clear language from Banberry: 
Once [the municipality has disclosed the basis of its 
calculations to whoever challenges the reasonableness of its 
subdivision fees], the burden of showing failure to comply with 
the constitutional standard of reasonableness in this matter is 
on the challengers. 
631 P.2d at 904. Emphasis added. Bracketed material added for clarity. 
The "basis" for the City's "impact fee" could have been disclosed to 
Plaintiffs when they paid the impact fee in July 1977; because neither of 
the Plaintiffs testified we do not know if this was done. In any event, 
during the course of the litigation, that basis has been disclosed to the 
Plaintiffs. See Defendant's responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, 
dated January 7, 1982. [Record at 780] In any event, the "basis" was fully 
disclosed to the Plaintiffs at the September 1982 hearings before the 
Court. Not only was the "basis" presented, under oath, but Plaintiffs had 
an opportunity to cross-examine that evidence'! 
c 
A brief response should be made to Plaintiffs' unsubstantiated (and 
legally incorrect) claims: 
POINT I. WEST JORDAN HAD THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE. West 
Jordan did disclose the "basis" of the "impact fee" ordinance. It 
disclosed to the Plaintiffs its accounting records, both in response to 
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pre-trial discovery and during the September 1982 hearing. The "impact 
fee" proceeds were deposited into a "segregated" account: the "flood 
control" account. The trial judge ruled that the Defendant had met its 
burden under the case law AND Judge Rigtrup's pre-trial order. 
POINT II: WEST JORDAN MUST LOSE IF IT FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF 
PRODUCING EVIDENCE. As noted, this is an incorrect analysis out ignore 
the fact that the TRIAL COURT RULED the Defendant HAD METS ITS BURDEN. 
Plaintiffs' argument is summarized, in Plaintiffs' brief [p.8], as 
follows: 
Thus, in this case, the order of proof is as follows: 
A. West Jordan has the burden to come forward with 
the evidence of why and how and where the seven 
percent was spent. 
B. Plaintiff has the burden of persuasion to show 
that such expenditures are unreasonable. 
However, if the defendant does not satisfy its burden with 
respect to A, we never will get to step B. 
The problem with this argument is that DEFENDANT DID SATISFY THIS 
BURDEN. The trial court so ruled. The Defendant did explain the reason 
"why" the fee was exacted and "where" the monies were spent. [See 
Exhibit 4-D, which summarized several hundred pages of billings and checks 
(Exhibit D-24)---which had been submitted to the Plaintiffs (July 1982) 
pursuant to their discovery request---showing the disbursements made from 
the" flood control" account.] It is incredible that Plaintiffs continually 
ignore this evidence! 
Those exhibits and discovery documents disclose every penny spent for 
capital projects from the "flood control" account. Not only do they 
disclose where "impact fees" were expended, but they also represent the 
expenditures of hundreds of thousands of dollars of "subsidy" because the 
7% impact fee was not enough. 
POINT III: WEST JORDAN HAS FAILED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT A PUBLIC 
HEARING WAS HELD AND THAT THE PLANNING COMMISSION PREPARED THE ORDINANCE. 
This point is more fully discussed at Point III, below. It should suffice 
to note that the trial court found that there was such a public hearing 
held and that the ordinance was properly prepared. See Finding No. 22. 
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Additionally, the court found: 
The Plaintiffs submitted no evidence to '>t1uw 1 h81 a ri•ihl ir 
hearing was not held or that the Planning & Zon1nq lomrn1ss1on 
did not prepare the Ordinance. 
Finding No. 22. 
POINT IV: WEST JORDAN HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE 
SEVEN PERCENT FEE IS A RESTRICTED FUND. Monies collected pursuant to the 
"impact fee" ordinance WERE PLACED INTO A RESTRICTED FUND: the "flood 
control" account of the general fund. On this point, the Court must be 
cognizant that the particular accounting "label" is not significant; 
rather, the concept is important. Did the City account for those monies 
so collected? Yes. The aforementioned documents attest the appropriate 
accounting controls were present. The evidence showed no expenditures 
were made, except for the specified purposes: flood control and parks. 
Mr. Sharkey "retreated" from his testimony that the money may have been 
used for an improper purpose (i.e. "on the Mayor's car"---quoted on P. 16 
of Plaintiffs' brief). [Record at 1749, line 7.] Certainly, if such an 
expenditure (for the Mayor's car or any other illegitimate purpose) had 
been made, it would have been paraded by the Plaintiffs as their prime 
exhibit. Not one of the checks, etc., contained within Exhibit D-24 shows 
any such improper expenditure. 
POINT V: WEST JORDAN HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT A 
FLAT SEVEN PERCENT FEE IS APPROPRIATE FOR ALL SUBDIVISIONS. Again, the 
burden is not on the City to make such a showing. Indeed, if such a 
showing (that the uniform impact fee was appropriate for ALL subdivisions 
in the city) were required, the trial would have lasted one hundred days!! 
Rather, as noted above, the issues at trial were to be limited to 
Plaintiffs' subdivision. Further, that Plaintiffs had the burden of 
showing the "unreasonableness" of the fee. Again , Plaint i ff s are 
injecting new issues. This litigation will never finish if such an 
approach is countenanced. 
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POINT VI: DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THE 
SEVEN PERCENT FEE FALLS EQUALLY ON OLD-TIMERS, NEW-COMERS, AND 
FUTURE-COMERS. Again, Banberry clearly placed this burden upon the 
Plaintiffs, as "challengers." The Plaintiffs presented NO EVIDENCE on 
this point and accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed. 
Also, the specific nature of this case is factually significant from 
Banberry. In this case the "impact fee" was assessed only because of the 
"needs created" for parks and flood-control. These "needs" have been 
quantified. The expenditures have been made. The capital improvements 
for parks and flood control are much easier to isolate than the capital 
improvements necessary for a new sewage treatment facility made necessary 
by the new development. 
The Wescall "impact fee" was a one-time payment, used to off-set the 
impact upon parks and flood-control. There are no "on going" charges (such 
as sewer service fee) to take into account. Similarly, the "impact fee" 
WAS NOT USED BY THE CITY AS A GENERAL REVENUE MEASURE. Nor was the basis 
of the fee and the purposes for its use "retroactively" established by the 
City Council. Contrast Lafferty vs Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982). 
The "purposes" for the "impact fee" were set by the ordinance at its 
adoption in 1975: flood-control and parks and recreation areas. The 
evidence showed no variance from those purposes. 
In any event, the burden is upon the challengers. 
POINT VII: THIS CASE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE NEED FOR FLOOD 
CONTROL AND PARKS. At this point, after Plaintiffs have flip-flopped back 
and forth on the issues, one wonders what this case does deal with. 
As a minimum, the Plaintiffs analysis is incorrect. The existence of 
"other methods" available to finance these projects is immaterial to the 
issues involved. Call I, Call II, and Banberry all affirm the principle 
that an "impact fee" CAN BE ASSESSED against developers to pay for the 
needs created by that development. 
Plaintiffs imply that the City should have financed these projects 
through "bonding" or other methods. To have done so would merely shifted 
the burden created by the "few" to be borne by the "many". That is 
patently unfair to the "many": those "old" residents should not be 
required to pay, even in part, for the additional "needs" created by the 
"new" development, especially when the developers have profited by the 
development creating those needs. 
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POI NT I I I 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, at page 10 of their brief, assert that "C'anned" f1nchr1qs 
were prepared by West Jordan and were: 
••• mechanically signed by Judge Dee some months after 
hearing the evidence. That practice has been criticized. 
Emphasis added. 
Such could not be further from the truth. The findings WERE NOT 
"mechanically signed" by the trial judge. They were signed only AFTER the 
Plaintiffs had submitted to the court seven pages of objections to the 
proposed findings [Record at 1251-1256A] and oral argument had been heard 
on March 14th. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs submitted an additional 204 
pages of supporting documentation (cases, argumentative briefs and 
exhibits, court orders, etc. [See Mr. DeBry's letter to Judge Dee, dated 
March 29, 1983. Record at 1260-1491] 
On April 22, 1983, Judge Dee, certainly being apprised of all 
relevant issues and after he had had ample opportunity to inspect the 
additional information furnished by the Plaintiffs, signed the Findings. 
Certainly, the signing of the Findings cannot be characterized as being 
"mechanically signed". 
The fact that the signing occurred "some months after hearing the 
evidence," is totally of the Plaintiffs' making. First, the order of trial 
was reversed by Judge Rigtrup because Plaintiffs claimed they could not 
understand the discovery documents furnished to them. [Mr Sharkey later 
admitted that prior to the August 6, 1982 hearing before Judge Rigtrup he 
made only a "cursory examination" of the discovery materials (Exhibit 
D-24) furnished to Plaintiffs the month earlier. Record at 1736.] Judge 
Rigtrup required the City to present evidence on limited issues. The City" 
went first" on these limited issues. Then, at the November 18, 1982 
hearing---scheduled more than two months earlier---so Plaintiffs would 
have time to inspect the documents and investigate the sworn 
testimony---the Plaintiffs presented their case. Closing arguments were in 
the form of a written brief by Plaintiff's counsel. The Court took the 
matter under advisement and allowed Defendant's counsel time to prepare a 
responsive brief. On December 22, 1982 the trial court rendered its 
"Memorandum Decision" [Appendix "A"] . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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I ~w werP IHPpared by the prevailing party---as expressly directed by the 
I rial rourt---and forwarded to the court and opposing counsel in 
rntd-Jariuary 1983. In late-January 1983, Plaintiffs' counsel submitted his 
"ubjections" to the proposed Findings and scheduled oral argument on those 
"objections" for March 14, 1983. After the argument, Plaintiffs' counsel 
submitted the 200+ pages of briefs, etc., to the Court as supportive 
documentation. The Findings were not signed by the trial judge until April 
21' 1983. 
Regardless of when the Findings were signed is the fact that the 
trial judge---ostensibly when the evidence was "fresh" in his memory and 
without any improper suggestion from zealous counsel---ruled THAT 
PLAINTIFFS HAD FAILED TO PROVE THEIR CLAIMS BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE. See the trial court's "Memorandum Decision", Appendix "A". 
Plaintiffs assert that there was no evidence to support the court's 
findings. This is incorrect. The following table indicates the pages of 
the Record of testimony presented to the trial court supporting these 
specific findings. 
FINDING NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
ZS 
26 
27 
PAGE OF RECORD WHERE TESTIMONY ON ISSUE WAS PRESENTED 
Not in Dispute 
1565-1570, 1572, 1581-1582, 1622 
1541, 1552 
1617 
Not in Dispute 
1696' 1703-1704 
1688-1689, 1691 
1763, 1676, 1678-1680, 1694-1695 
1747 
1744-1745, 1762 
1745-1746, 1748-1750, 1687, 1592, 1594, 1598, 
1614 
1616-1619, 1624, 1626, 1630, 1634, 1700 
1581-1582, 1623 
1582-1583, 1594, 1622-1623 
1584, 1632 
1593-1594, 1598, 1616, 1619, 1624, 1636 
1598-1601, 1619-1622 
1617' 1700 
1699 
1700 
1556-1558, 1681, 1684, 1697' 1700 
1542-1543, 1548, 1551-1553, 1555, 1559-1560, 1642, 
1644, 1646-1649, 1653, 1655-1659, 1661, 1672, 
1673 
1537-1538, 1548, 1576 
1731-1733, 1736, 1740, 1742 
1745-1746, 1748-1750 
441, 760, 1752 
1606, 1612-1613, 1617, 1620, 1636 
19 
28 
29 
161 3' 161 7' 16 20 
1613, 1617, 1620, 1636, 17hl 
The Findings and Judgment of the trial court arP P11l 1t !Pr1 ID a 
presumption of correctness. The appellant must sust a111 ttie t11irr1Pn uf 
showing error. The Supreme Court should review the record in a !1ghl most 
favorable to the findings of the trial Judge and should not to disturb 
them if lhe Supreme Court finds substantial support in the evidence. 
Kohler vs Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); Piacitelli vs Southern 
Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981); Litho Sales Inc. vs 
Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981); Score vs Wilson, 611 P.2d 367 (Utah 
1982); Highland Construction Co. vs Stephenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981); 
Knight vs Leigh, 619 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980); and Search vs Union Pacific R. 
Co., 649 P.2d 48 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
they are clearly against the weight of the evidence. Ute-Cal. Land 
Development vs Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981). 
It is not the Supreme Court's prerogative to determine whether the 
evidence preponderated on one side or the other; that is the 
responsibility of the trier of fact. Reimchiissel vs Russell, 649 P.2d 26 
(Utah 1982). 
The Supreme Court should not substitute its view of the evidence for 
that of the District Court. Nielsen vs Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1980); Fisher vs Taylor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977); Hidden Meadows 
Dev. Co. vs Mills, 690 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1978); Bustanente vs Bustamente, 
645 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982). 
On review, the Supreme Court will accord considerable deference to 
the judgment of the trial court due to its advantaged position and will 
not disturb action of that court unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
to the contrary or the trial court abuses its discretion. Openshaw vs 
Openshaw, 639 P.2d 177 (Utah 1981); Christensen vs Christensen, 628 P.2d 
1297 (Utah 1981). 
The foregoing cases clearly and unequivocabl y indicate that this 
court should defer to Judge Dee's Findings. The Plaint 1 ffs' blanket 
assertions that there was no evidence, are incorrect. As shown 111 the 
table above, there was considerable evidence to support the trial court 
findings. 
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,\q~t'I, lh1s ex1sterice of evidence must be contrasted with the 
Pl,11nt dfs' evidence in the form of testimony by Mr. Sharkey who openly 
admitted he was "unable to formulate an opinion" concerning the 
expen1j1ture of the funds. This lack of evidence cannot be considered to 
outweigh the overwhelming preponderance of evidence which showed that the 
subdivision did create needs and that the monies collected pursuant to the 
Impact Fee Ordinance was expended in the furtherance of those needs. 
The findings and judgment of the trial court, in its advantaged 
position to fully weigh and savor the evidence, should not be disturbed. 
Those findings and judgment should be upheld by the Supreme Court. 
Plaintiffs claim [p. B of their Brief] that the Planning & Zoning 
Commission did not prepare the ordinance and there was no public hearing 
held prior to the preparation of the "impact fee" ordinance. Again, this 
is incorrect. There was evidence on this point. 
Ronald Olson, the West Jordan City Recorder, testified concerning the 
preparation of the ordinance. The Planning & Zoning Commission had an 
informal policy of requiring the voluntary deduction of "green areas" by 
subdividers. The "minutes" of the April 17, 1974 meeting of the Planning & 
Zoning Commission [which were read into the Record at pp. 1672-1673] 
re fleet the foll owing entry: 
Mr. Buchanan has researched the deduction of property from 
a subdivision for public use, and there is no legal basis for 
this. We can only recommend and suggest that this be given but 
the developer can reject it. He, also, mentioned that the City 
Attorney should work on the wording so that it can be used for 
the general public and not just one subdivision ••• 
Emphasis added. 
Glen Moosman, a former city councilman, testified concerning the 
genesis of the "impact fee" ordinance: 
There was a public hearing for the consideration of the Master 
Plan of the City of West Jordan and the ordinances and various 
concepts, and it was held in the West Jordan Junior High. 
Emphasis added. Record at 1656. 
Mr. Moosman further testified that the meeting was publicized through 
flyers and that the meeting was held in the school auditorium---not the 
normal meeting place for the West Jordan City Council---to accommodate the 
large number of persons in attendance. Even some developers were in 
attendance. Record at 1657. Moosman indicated that: 
"these concepts of flood control and reservation of land for 
parks and recreation issues [were] discussed at that meeting." 
?1 
Record at 1659. 
Mr. Moosman further testified that there was a quPsl1on from the 
audience---a Mrs. Schmidt---concerning flood control. Moosman test1f1ed: 
He [Mr. Buchanan, the City Planner] then explainPd that 
each developer must take care of his own flood water that 
originates on his property. They have suggested catch basins 
that can be used both for flood control and recreational use. 
Record at 1661. Bracketed material added for clarity. 
Moosman then quoted the City Council minutes for that August 1974 
public hearing: 
Good examples of this type of use is the football field at 
East High and the Sugarhouse Park. 
Record at 1661 • 
Mr. Nick Colessides, the then City Attorney for West Jordan, 
testified concerning the preparation of the "impact fee" ordinance: 
The Planning Commission--any ordinance relating to matters 
pertaining to planning and zoning would have to have been passed 
by the Planning Commission prior to its arrival to the City 
Council for final passage and posting. In this particular 
instance, again from memory, when the ordinance was first 
drafted it would have been sent to Planning & Zoning for their 
review as well, and after whatever recommendations they would 
have made it would have come up with the City Council where it 
would have been discussed again. And if further revision was 
necessary, further revision would be made, and finally passed by 
the City Council. 
Record at 1644. Emphasis added. 
Certainly the "time frane" under which the "impact fee" ordinance was 
adopted is consistent: from April 1974 (when the City Attorney was 
directed Planning Commission "to work on the wording") to August 1974 
(when the public hearing was held in the junior high schoo 1) to January 
1975 (when the ordinance was finally adopted). The "impact fee" ordinance 
was not just the product of hastily perceived need, but rather the 
well-founded, properly publicized and fully-explained plan to solve a 
pressing "public welfare" issue within the local community. 
In any event the Plaintiffs presented absolutely NO EVIDENCE to show 
the public hearing was not held or that the "impact fee" ordinance was 
"prepared" by the Planning & Zoning Commission. The trial court's 
"Findings" indicate: 
The Plaintiffs submitted no evidence to show that a public 
hearing was not held or that the Planning and Zoning Commission 
did not prepare the Ordinance. 
Findings No. 22. 
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POINT IV 
THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CERTIFIED AS A CLASS ACTION 
When this '3ction was filed in 1978, it was designated as a "class 
action." In April 1978 Judge David K. Winder, then a state judge, ruled 
that the action should not be certified. His decision (regarding the 
non-certification) was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court [even though the 
Plaintiffs' counsel later represented to Judge Banks that the issue HAD 
NOT been appealed; see Record at 420]. In Call I and Call II, the Court 
did not discuss the issue with the use of the terms "class action", the 
Court did rule on the general issue: namely, that a "class action 
certification" was not appropriate. 
In the summer of 1981---following remand to the district court---the 
Plaintiffs renewed their motion for "class action certification". That 
motion was heard by Judge Jay E. Banks, who denied the motion for class 
action certification. Plaintiffs thereupon filed an "interlocutory appeal" 
to this Court. [Docket No. 18098] This Court denied, without opinion, the 
interlocutory appeal. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed in this Court an 
original proceeding seeking a writ of mandamus against Judge Banks, 
requiring him to enter formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
to why he had denied the certification of the "class action." [Docket 
No.18217] The City---as real-party-in-interest---responded. The Court, 
without written opinion, denied to issue the writ of mandamus. 
On September 1, 1982---the first day of trial---Plaintiffs again 
renewed their motion for class action "certification". The Motion was 
heard by Judge Dee, who took the matter under advisement---after receiving 
Plaintiffs' lengthy Memorandum of Law in support of the Motion. In 
December 1982 Judge Dee ruled that the action should not be "certified." 
[See the trial court's "Memorandum Decision", Appendix "A", herein.] Judge 
Dee also made extensive findings as to WHY A CLASS ACTION IS INAPPLICABLE 
FOR THIS CASE. See Findings 30-33. 
A 
THIS LITIGATION IS NOT "CLASS ACTION" MATERIAL 
The Plaintiffs have been able to assemble---from the literally 
tlmusands of cases discussing "class actions"---and quote some authorities 
as to why this action should be a class action. They simply overlook the 
simple facts as to why it should not be a class action. 
nLJ11ber of part lP"-l i) ;u 1 Jn»r 111 t 1 1 i' 
dun' t even cA<re db out JrJ i r111111 11). )lJ 
l t t t 1 p ~) l ,-1l1 It l ft < WP r I' a 
nl.ITlber of developers who were a 11 cru·~·, '>Pct 1011" 1)f t hp propo'...JPd "1-] ,J'-.S", 
1 t might be proper to cert if,. 
plaintiffs and they certainlv ar<>n't a rPpresentat1ve ··ruc,s spct1on. 
Secondly, we do not have a situation ...tiere a number of lawsuits has 
been flied on the same issue (here it would be the const ltut1onalltv of 
the ordinance'. In that situation, the class action becomes a method of 
consolidating the tnals---and preventing future trials, because all the 
class members can be bound by the one judgment. Here, we have onlv the 
~E LAWSUIT. The other sixty-nine developers DO '<OT SEEM TO CARE---and 
that's even after the casP attracted widespread attention. 
will not consolidate any trials, because there are none. 
prevent future trials, because there will be none. 
Cert1Ficat10n 
It wll l not 
Further, certification does not prevent "1ncons1stent" conduct on the 
part of the City v1s-a-v1s the class members. It likewise wll l not 
prevent such "inconsistent" adjud1cat1ons, because there will be no other 
claims to ad.Judicate. And there are likely to be none. This is confirmed 
by the fact that the fee has been assessed since 1975 and with today's 
financial market what it is, no developer---have paid the fee "under 
protest"---1s going to sit around for five or six years to bring suit to 
get it back, if he thought he had a legal claim.] 
THE FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY C£ THE ORDINANCE WAS UPHELD BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. The Court remanded the case for trial on an "as applied" 
b BS l S. Such individualized ; "as applied"' issues are not the proper 
subject of "class act 10n 11 t 1qat ion." 
Pla1nt1ffs' continued rnnt1on r,1r "class cert1f1c1t1 1Jn 11 , ""°'1Pn tht> '.:;ame has 
been expressly denied on three OCL''-3Slons b\ three cJPpar11tP tr13l Ji.Jrit)P':; rir1(j 
Implicitly denlt>d b' the Utah Suprt>me ~ourt, has lonq "''C"' :1orie b>"\•J••I the 
realm of zealous advocacy. The namPd Pla1nt1ffs ~rP 'lot '1df1lP 1-1 lf', 0~11, ',.,i,11, b\ 
the denial of class act 10n cert1f1cat1on. fln t:1p othPr hand, ">e "r~Det tl io1J'i 
contention" of Pla1nt1ffs' counsel---s11[p obJert 
party-l1tiqants, so as to perhaps justir, 'l tnq,wr 
in my op1n1on, on unethical profes--:;1c1n3l '-' 1JnC~LJC~: 
c 11 ent s and st 1 r r rnq uri 11 t 1ri at ton. 
Jf r"l'tl1cr--1 L-; '.,1'1r:'''l 1n n11rP 
~ttJr•1p,'5 t-~ 0 ' ---bur1Jt-':,. 
l 'llJ r:; P·' '."' ~, ' , 1 - Lt --J If"\ j f 
The> monev was 
' '· ,. r • •.1 u l Den ° r1 t ;rn rJ t •J l n s t a 1 l fl o o d con t r o l 
r rr , , ,~ , l ~ 1 f' •-; P I r1 ( 1 l 1 f 1 • 
r1t-•t-'11 f,-.,1 !11~· ~~c1l1t1es. 
w .. J!.J liPneF1t the slild1v1sion creating the 
Iri such a case it is fundamental for each 
dP\P\nJ1'-,r to 3f~P how "his" flood control moneys were spent. In this 
ser1sP, Par·h StJbr11v1sirrn woulrl "stand alone" 1although in a limited way, 
snme> suh<11v1sio11s mav hP interconnected to the same detention basin, as 
was discussed above 1 in its flood control needs and solution. l>tiether the 
City spent the Fee so collected in a manner "demonstrably benefitting" 
subdivision "A" has no bearing on whether the City spent the money 
collected Fran slildivision "Z". Certification as a "class action" does not 
cnake the resolution of this issue easier; rather, certification makes it 
more complex. Certification blurs, by lumping into one pot, the 
distinctions the Supreme Court felt dispositive. The Supreme Court has 
already decided the Fundamental concept behind the 7% fee. By llJllping each 
of the 70 or so subdivisions into a single category (via the "class 
action" certification" and adjudicating the issue does not make any sense. 
The "as applied" issue cannot be adjudicated on that basis. It requires 
individualized consideration. 
Separating the class members into subclasses (as proposed by the 
Plaintiffs) is similarly unsuitable. There would have to be one subclass 
for each member. It simply does not make sense to llJllp everyone together, 
adjudicate the general issue [WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY DECIDED] 
on a group basis---via the "general fund" issue Plaintiffs raise---and 
then break everyone out into an "individualized subclass (of one member 
each'" to adjudicate the "as applied" issue concerning "demonstrable 
benefit." Logic and common sense dictate that such a manner of 
approaching and handling litigation is wasteful. If anything, class 
actions are supposed to be efficient, not wasteful of time and resources. 
The fact that the money collected pursuant to the Ordinance was 
t1Ppos1ter1 into the "general fund" does not, as Plaintiffs suggest, mandate 
"class act ion" handling of this matter. Prior to the Call I, the iaw 
'statutorv and the regulations issued thereunder by the Office of the 
StdlP ~udllir' required municipalities to deposit such moneys into the 
"r1Pr1er3l Fund"; hav1nq a separate "fund" was not allowed. Thus, the City 
Just because the moneys were co-mingled 
w1t~, •pp, r~"1m nthF"r developers does not render the issue a "class 
2S 
action." Rather, the issue is whether or rrnt lhP rnrllwy "~" ·opPnt tn a 
manner which would "demonstrably benefit" the subdiv1s1on which created 
the need for the facilities. 
B 
THE CITY POSSESSES "INDIVIDUALIZED" DEFENSfS 
AGAINST THE CLASS MEMBERS 
Under Rule 23 specific criteria must be present before a class action 
can be maintained. Plaintiffs have failed to show a number of essential 
elements. One of these is that there are "individualized" defenses which 
the City can assert. 
Obviously, the "as applied" nature of the issues raises 
individualized defenses. How the money from one developer is spent has no 
effect on how the money from another developer is spent. One developer may 
have a valid claim: the "impact fee" collected from him may be totally 
"unreasonable," because his development may have created no needs. On the 
other hand, that invalidity has no bearing as to the "impact fee" assessed 
against another developer WHO DID CREATE THE NEEDS. 
The City's second defense is that each of the unnamed class members 
did not file a "notice of claim" with the City, as required by Sections 
63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated. Because such notices have not been filed 
within the statutory time period, the claims are "forever barred." Thus, 
the City has an absolute defense against the claims of such members. 
Certification would then require a division of the plaintiffs into two 
subclasses: those who had filed the statutorily-required "notice" [here 
only the named Plaintiffs] and those who had not filed the "notice." When 
the subclasses are so structured, it is obvious that John Call and Clark 
Jenkins cannot represent those unnamed members who belong to the other 
subclass. First, their interests are dissimilar. [This situation 
adequately indicates the problem in having a "class action" prosecuted by 
a single plaintiff: when it gets down to the nitty-gritty issues 
involved, that sole plaintiff cannot represent everyone, especially when 
he does not constitute a "cross section" of the potenttal plaintiffs. It 
doesn't make any difference here that there are two named plaintiffs; both 
of the name plaintiffs were partners developing a single subdivision at 
issue.] 
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c 
!HE NAMED PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ADEQUATELY REPRESENT THE INTERESTS 
OF THE UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS 
8y their past conduct in this litigation, Plaintiffs have evidenced a 
lack of concern towards the interests and rights of the unnamed class 
members. As an example of such disregard, I point out that on September 
1, 1982---the first day of trial---again they moved the court for class 
certification. Anybody who brings a "class action" and then waits the day 
of trial to notify the unnamed class members (whose rights he seeks to 
represent and bind) cannot be said to "adequately represent" their 
interests, as required by the Rule. The Plaintiffs claim that "notice" to 
the putative class members is not required for this "spurious" class 
action. If they (the class members) do not need to be notified of the 
action, then why do they have to be NOW included? 
D 
CERTIFICATION AS A "CLASS ACTION" IS 
IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE WRITTEN 
DIRECTIONS CF FORMER DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
In Call II this Court noted: 
In this case the rule adopted by this Court in Call I, 
quoted ante, cannot be applied without plaintiffs being given 
the opportunity to present evidence to show that the dedication 
required of them had no reasonable relationship to the needs for 
flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by 
their subdivision, if any. Implicit in this rule is the 
requirement that if the subdivision generates such needs and 
West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedication, it is only 
fair that the fee so collected be used in a way as to benefit 
demonstrably the subdivision in question. This is not to say 
that the benefit must be solely [emphasis in original text] to 
the particular subdivis~ut only that there be some 
demonstrable benefit to it. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
614 P.2d at 1259. (Except where noted, all emphasis added.) 
It is obvious that this Court---presented with the "class action" 
issue on appeal---decided that a class action was not the method for 
trial. Rather, the Court mandated the issues to be those of "reasonable 
relationship ... to the needs .. created by their subdivision." 
(Emphasis added.) Subdivisions throughout the City were not to be 
27 
included. ONLY this ONE SUBDIVISION---and its tmpcicl afld f~e'---liPr>e tn iiP 
litigated. The City's obligation was to usP the fee "tfl a way as to 
demonstrably benefit the subdivision in question." The C111Jrl could ""' 
have been more clear on the issue. 
Obviously, certification as a "class action" violates the Court's 
directive that further proceedings "not inconsistent with this opinion" be 
held. 
In Banberry the Court stated: 
In Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979), 
opinion on rehearing, 614 P.2d 1257 (1980), this court upheld 
the validity of a city ordinance that required subdividers, as a 
condition of plat approval, to dedicate certain proposed 
subdivision land to the city (or pay cash in lieu) for flood 
control and/or park or recreation facilities. In remanding the 
case for trial on the constitutionality of the ordinance as 
applied (i.e., the requirement that the seven percent of the 
subdivision land be dedicated), this Court ruled that "the 
dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the need 
created by the subdivision." Id. at 1258. 
Under the reasonableness test in Call v. City of West 
jordan, supra, the benefits derived from the exaction need not 
accrue solely to the subdivision (614 P.2d at 1259); flood 
control and recreation are needs that cannot be treated in 
isolation from the rest of the municipality. At the Salle time, 
the benefits derived from the exaction must be of "demonstrable 
benefit" to the subdivision. (Id. at 1259). 
531 P.2d 905 (Emphasis added.) 
The language quoted above could more clearly indicate the Court's 
feeling on the "individualized nature" of the issues to be tried. It does 
violence to that simple language to even consider approaching these issues 
on a "class action" basis. To do so is certainly "inconsistent with" both 
the express written opinion of the Supreme Court and the "spirit" of that 
written opinion. 
Obviously, "class action" certification of this litigation is very 
inappropriate. This is especially so by reason of the late stage the 
proceedings are now at. 
Accordingly, the motion for "class action" certification must be 
denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
The 'iCJle "issue" to be determined in this matter, following the Call 
II dec1s1on, was the "reasonableness" of the "impact fee" as applied to 
the ind1v1dual Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs presented absolutely no evidence 
to show that the "impact fee" assessed against them was "unreasonable." 
The trial court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims for their 
failure to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the "impact fee" 
was unreasonable. 
There was presented substantial, competent evidence---most, if not 
all of which was unrebutted---to show that the Wescall Slbdivision created 
needs within the municipality. The trial court found that the monies 
collected from the Plaintiffs as the "impact fee" were used to address 
those needs created by the Plaintiffs' development. 
Not only does the Supreme Court not have the time to re-evaluate the 
evidence submitted (as Plaintiffs seem to ask it to do), but for policy 
reasons the Supreme Court should not attempt to overrule the trial court. 
The trial court sits in an advantaged position to fully weigh the 
evidence; its findings should not be disturbed. This is especially true 
when there was substantial evidence presented to support those findings. 
Plaintiffs' motion for "class action" certification is improperly 
motivated. The Plaintiffs are in no way harmed if the action is not 
certified, especially at this late stage. There are many reasons why the 
action should not be certified as a class action; the trial court found 
some of these reasons. Certainly the trial court ought to be granted some 
deference in this type of decision which so severely hampers the trial 
court and the party-litigants. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' appeal should be dismissed. The judgment of 
the trial court should be affirmed and the Defendant be awarded its costs 
in defending this action. 
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the district court 
for the full presentation of the Defendant's case-in-chief. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of October, 1983. 
~~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERT IF IC ATE 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the forego1ng RE'iPUNDlNf' S HR!Et to 
Mr Robert J DeBry, 965 E. 4800 South, Salt Lake City, Utah R4117, this ~th 
day of October, 1983. 
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I:' THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN A'ID FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL and CLARK JEllKINS, 
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VS Civil No C-78-829 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH 
Defendant 
The trial of the above-captioned matter on a procedural 
bas is came on before this Court September 1 and 2, 1982 
following the previous Pretrial Order of Judge Rigtrup, with 
plaintiff being represented by Robert J. Debry, Esq , and 
defendant being represented by Stephen G. Homer, Esq , City 
Attorney for West Jordan. At that procedural hearing, limited 
issues of defendant's projected case in chief were presented 
for the purpose of allowing discovery to be continued on 
behalf of the plaintiff. Then, on November 18, 1982, trial 
cormnenced with plaintiffs producing witness Gerald Sharkey, 
a C P.A., who went over the information which had been 
obtained bv defendant as a result of the Ciscovery previously 
allowed 
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' presentation, 
the defendant prior to putting on its case in chief, moved 
the Court to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint or grant Jud~ent 
in favor of the defendant, and the Court at that juncture 
requested that counsel for both sides provide written 
me~oranda conceniinP, their position so that the Court could 
make the appropriate rulin~. The Court after having received 
APPENDIX "A" 
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CALL, ET AL VS CITY 
OF WEST JORDAN P.-\GE '.\/0 
written memoranda on the t'.vo issues LJ..:_.o>e'J JC >::!-,i::. 1 in· _ _,_ He~ 
now makes and enters its :vlemorandurr '.":lec1s:,)n :3.S .:-nLl 
The two issues for deterrninatL)n are 
1. Whether the matter herein involved should be 
certified for class action under Rule 23, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and 
2. Whether defendant's motion to dismiss rilaintiffs' 
Complaint or as characterized, grant a motion in favor of 
defendant against the plaintiffs should be Rranted 
On the first issue concerning the certification of 
class action, the Court after havin~ reviewed the prior 
decisions of Jud~e Banks and Judge Winder as they are limitedly 
shown in the file, together with the information supuorting 
those prior motions and the present status of the file and 
the authorities presented by defendant, now rules that the 
matter should not be certified for class action, and the 
motion for such certification is denied. 
On the second issue, it seems clear from the testimony 
of the witness presented by the defendants, and also by an 
examination of the accounting records as testified to by 
Mr. Sharkey, that the impact fee assessed against the 
Wescall Subdivision was not unreasonable, and on this issue 
the Court finds that the plaintiffs failed to convince this 
Court by a preponderance of the evidence that there was an 
unreasonable fee assessed, and on this basis, therefore, the 
Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
Complaint, and no cause for action. 
Mr. Stephen G. Homer is directed to preoare the appropriate 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgrrient, not 
inconsistent with this ~emorandurn Decision 
Dated this 2'2-- day of December, 1982 
' ' l . ~ 
I ' ~ I 
_, ___ ...-" 
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STEPHEN G HOMER 
West Jordan City Attorney 
1850 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone 561-1463 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
VS 
Civil No. C-78-829 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant 
The Court, having heard oral testimony on September 1st and 2nd and 
November 18th, 1982 and having fully examined the exhibits received into 
evidence and having heard the arguments of counsel thereon and having been 
fully apprised in all premises herein, now enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs are the owners and developers of a 30-acre tract of 
real property, located in the extremely southwestern corner of the city 
limits of the City of West Jordan, said real property having been subdivided 
and developed and being now known as the Wescall Subdivision. 
2. The City of West Jordan, Utah, is a small community in the southwest 
portion of Salt Lake County and is located between the Jordan River and the 
Ocuirrh Mountains. 
APPENDIX "8" 
3. On January 21, 1975, the then governing boclv ot the Cit'/ 0f 1,,est Jordan 
adopted an ordinance [hereinafter "the Ordinance"l which required developers 
of real property within the City to dedicate to the City seven percent of the 
land so developed or to donate to the City the cash eouivalent thereof, said 
donations and dedications to be used for flood control and park and recreation 
purposes. 
4. In July 1977 the Plaintiffs obtained approval from the governing body 
of the City to develop their parcel of real property, which was subsequently 
thereto developed into a residential subdivision consisting of 96 lots upon 
which single-family residential dwellings have been constructed. 
5. As a condition of subdivision development approval, the Plaintiffs 
were required to donate to the City the sum of $16,576 as equivalent to seven 
percent of the value of the land developed. Said $16,576 was received by the 
City from the Plaintiffs in July 1977. 
6. The $16,576 paid by the Plaintiffs and similar monies paid by other 
developers for other subdivisions were placed into the general fund of the 
City in an account bearing the designation "Flood Control". Over the years 
since 1975, this "flood control'' account has had different accounting designations 
applied to it. From the "flood control" account, expenditures were made by the 
City for capital improvements for flood control and for parks and recreation 
areas. 
7. Since 1975 the City collected from developers approximately $525,000 
in impact fees under the Ordinance. 
8. Since 1975 the City expended from the aforementioned "flood control" 
account approximately $1,200,000 for the construction of capital improvements 
for tlood control projects and for parks and recreation areas in the city. 
9. The difference between the money actually collected from the impact 
fees paid by the developers pursuant to the Ordinance and the amounts actually 
expended by the City represents a subsidy on the part of the City to the effect 
that the City contributed additional amounts from other revenue sources to 
finance the flood control projects, parks and recreation areas. 
10. The City of West Jordan follows generally accepted accounting principles 
for municipal governments and the provisions of state law by not having a fund 
ba 1 ance in the "flood contra l" account beyond the then-current budget year. 
For each year since January 1975 the City has zeroed-out the fund balances in 
the revenue portions of the "flood control" account. No evidence was presented 
by the Plaintiffs to show that such funds were not expended in the City's fiscal 
year (July to June) in which the impact fees had been collected. 
11. Even though the individual dollars paid by the Plaintiffs cannot be 
individually traced through the accounting records, the Court finds from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the monies were spent on flood control 
projects and parks and recreation areas for which the impact fee was assessed. 
No instances were shown where monies from the "flood control" account of the 
City were spent for items other than the capital improvements for flood control 
and for parks and recreation areas. No unauthorized or improper expenditures, 
such as gifts of personal property to elected or appointed officials, were 
made from such "flood control" account. 
12. The development of the Wescall Subdivision by the Plaintiffs generated 
needs specifically for flood control and parks and recreation areas within the 
city. 
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13. The topography of the land within the City is such that the land 
slopes downhill generally from west to east and from south to north. The 
natural drainage patterns flow in a generally easternly or notheasternly 
direction towards the Jordan River, the main natural drainage channel of the 
Salt Lake valley. 
14. Storm-water run-off created by and within the ~Jescall Subdivision 
will generally pass through the entire City before said run-off waters would 
be discharged into the Jordan River. 
15. Natural precipitation (rainfall) falling upon undeveloped land of 
the soil and vegetation ty~e customarily found in the City of West Jordan will 
run-off at a rate of 15 to 25 percent. Precipitation falling upon impervious 
structures (such as driveways, sidewalks, streets, patios, roofs and other 
structures and surfaces associated with the development of a modern residential 
subdivision, including the Wescall Subdivision) will run-off at a rate of 90 
percent. 
lG. The development of the Wescall Subdivision has created and will continue 
to create additional flood control run-off waters, which are for the most part 
discharged into the natural drainage channel known as Bingham Creek, which 
generally runs in an easternly direction through the city. 
17. The City has undertaken a project known as the "Bingham Creek Project" 
to pipe the drainage channel of Bingham Creek to avoid flooding in areas downstrear 
from the Wescall Subdivision. The cost of this project will exceed several hundred 
thousand dollars. The storm-water run-off created by the Wescall Subdivision 
contributes in part to the costs of the Bingham Creek Project. Were it not for 
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the additional storm-water run-off generated by the development of the Wescall 
Subdivision, the Bingham Creek Project could utilize a smaller size of pipe to 
handle a lesser quantity of storm-water run-off. 
18. The development of the Wescall Subdivision, together with the 
Plaintiffs' sale of the lots for residential purposes, has created and will 
continue to create needs for parks and recreation areas for the residents of 
the Subdivision. 
19. In the Wescall Subdivision there are in excess of 400 new residents 
who want and need parks and recreation areas. 
20. To maintain the status quo ratio of parks acreage to population 
existing at the time of the Wescall Subdivision development, the City had to 
obtain in excess of one acre of additional park area. 
21. To provide parks a~d recreation facilities in the area of the 
Wescall Subdivision and one other neighboring subdivision, the City purchased 
in 1977 the 2.5 acre "Booth Property" for use as a park. The cost to purchase 
this land was $g,ooo per acre for a total of $22,500. The funds from this 
purchase came from the aforementioned "flood control" account. 
22. Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance, the governing body of the City 
conducted a public hearing in which an overall master plan for the development 
of the city was discussed. This hearing (held in August 1974) was conducted in 
the West Jordan school auditorium so as to accomodate the large number of citizens 
in attendance. The specific concept of flood control and having an impact fee 
paid by new developers was discussed at that public hearing. The Ordinance was 
prepared by the West Jordan Planning and Zoning Commission, even though the, 
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City Attorney was responsible for the selection of the actua I lanquage used 
in the text of the Ordinance. The Plaintiffs submitted no evidence to show that 
a public hearing was not held or that the Planning and Zoning Commission did not 
prepare the Ordinance. 
23. The impact fees assessed under the Ordinance are calculated on the 
basis of the percentage of the land developed or, in the alternative, the 
cash value thereof. The Defendant disclosed the basis of its calculations to 
the Plaintiffs who challenged the reasonableness of the impact fee. 
24. The Plaintiffs were afforded numerous opportunities to examine the 
financial and other records of the City and undertook, through their counsel 
and other agents, such an examination. The City presented oral testimony and 
documents during a two-day (September 1st and 2nd, 1982) evidentiary hearing 
before the Court in which the City's witnesses explained the accounting records 
and concepts for the benefit of the Plaintiffs and their attorney. 
25. The Plaintiffs' accounting expert (Mr. Sharkey) examined the City's 
records for approximately 23 hours. Mr Sharkey indicated that on the basis of 
his examination of said records, he was unable to express an opinion as to how 
the impact fees collected pursuant to the Ordinance were spent. Mr Sharkey 
did concede that the expenditures from the "flood control" account, as claimed 
by the City and reflected in the City's records admitted into evidence, had in 
fact been made and that he (Mr. Sharkey) had found no improper or unauthorized 
expenditures from said "flood contro.I" account or the ex1 stence of any kind of 
"fund balance'' in which proceeds from the impact fees collected pursuant to 
the Ordinance were being retained beyond the expiration of the then-current 
fiscal year of the City. 
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26. The court-appointed master, whose final report was expressly waived 
by the Plaintiffs, indicated in his preliminary report to the Court that he 
felt it would take approximately two hundred hours to fully examine the City's 
financial records on the issues raised in this action. 
27. There is a reasonable relationship between the impact fee assessed 
against the Plaintiffs under the Ordinance and the needs created by the development 
of the Wescall Subdivision. 
28. The monies collected pursuant to the Ordinance from the Plaintiffs 
were used by the City in such a way as to demonstrably benefit the Wescall 
Subdivision and its residents, even though there may have been a secondary 
benefit granted to other subdivisions and residents. 
29. The impact fee under the Ordinance did not require the Plaintiffs, 
as developers of the Wescall Subdivision, to bear more than their share of the 
capital costs in relation to the benefits conferred. That portion of the impact 
fee used for parks and recreation areas is equitable in light of the relative 
benefits conferred on, as well as the relative burdens previously borne and 
yet to be borne by the Wescall Subdivision and its residents in comparison 
with the other properties in the city. The impact fee assessed under the 
Ordinance did not exceed the amounts sufficient to equalize the relative benefits 
and burdens of the Wescall Subdivision and other properties. The impact fee 
assessed against the Plaintiffs under the Ordinance was utilized solely for 
the construction of capital improvements (flood control projects and parks and 
recreation areas) made necessary by the development of the Wescall Subdivision. 
30. The putative class is not so numerous that joinder of all parties 
-' ' 
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is impracticable. 
31. The defenses which could be asserted bv the ~efPndant are not 
typical for all members of the class; specifically, whrlt 'nay be a 'reasonable 
fee for one subdivision may be "unreasonable" for another, when the specific 
needs, etc. of that latter subdivision are examined. 
32. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would 
not create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications or adjudications 
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members 
not parties to the action. 
33. Questions of law or fact common to the members of the putative class 
do not predominate over questions affecting only individual members. 
Entered this ~ day of~ 1983. 
DAVID B DEE, District J~;;: ~-'- ,,. 
CERTIFICATE IJ'0 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the proposed FINDINGS OF FACT to Mr Robert 
DeBry, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 965 E. 4800 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
this 14th day of January, 1983. 
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'"'."EJHE'I G HOMER 
~est Jordan City Attorney 
1850 West 7800 South 
~est Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone 561-1463 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs 
Civil No. C-78-829 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant 
The Court, having heard oral testimony on September lst and 2nd and 
November 18th, 1982 and having fully examined the exhibits received into 
evidence and having heard the arguments of counsel thereon and having been 
fully apprised in all premises herein and having heretofor entered Findings 
of Fact, now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
l. The City has disclosed to the Plaintiffs the basis upon which the 
impact fee under the 1975 Ordinance was calculated. The burden of showing 
failure to comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness in 
this matter is upon the Plaintiffs, as challengers. 
2. The Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to present evidence to 
show the dedication and/or donation required of them had no reasonable 
APPENDIX "C" 
l11 
relationship to the needs for flood control or parks dnd r~Lr~dtrun 
facilities created by the Wescall Subdivision. 
3. The Plaintiffs had the burden to show that the impact fee assessed 
under the Ordinance was unreasonably applied against them. 
4. The Ordinance in question is entitled to a presumption of con-
stitutional validity. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly upheld the 
facial constitutionality and validity of the Ordinance. 
5. The Plaintiffs have failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the Ordinance was unreasonable, in that the dedication 
required of the Plaintiffs had no reasonable relationship to the needs for 
flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by their subdivision. 
6. There is a reasonable relationship between the impact fee assessed 
against the Plaintiffs under the Ordinance and the needs created by the 
development of the Wescall Subdivision. 
7. Monies collected pursuant to the Ordinance from the Plaintiffs were 
used by the City in such a way to demonstrably benefit the Wescall Subdivision 
and its residents, even though there may have been a secondary benefit granted 
to the other subdivisions and residents. 
8. The impact fee under the Ordinance did not require the Plaintiffs, 
as developers of the Wescall Subdivision, to bear more than their share of 
the capital costs in relation to the benefits conferred. That portion of the 
impact fee used for parks and recreation areas is equitable in light of the 
relative benefits conferred on, as well as the relative burdens previously 
borne and yet to be borne by Wescall Subdivision and its residents in com-
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parison with the other properties in the City. The impact fee assessed 
under the Ordinance did not exceed the amounts sufficient to equalize the 
relative benefits and burdens of the Wescall Subdivision and other pro-
perties. The impact fee assessed against the Plaintiffs under the Ordinance 
was utilized solely for the construction of capital improvements (flood 
control projects and parks and recreation areas) made necessary by the 
development of the Wescall Subdivision. 
9. The impact fee collected from the Plaintiffs was used by the City 
in such a way as to demonstrably benefit the Wescall Subdivision even though 
there was a secondary benefit incurred for other subdivisions and residents. 
10. The impact fee under the Ordinance does not require the newly 
developed properties to bear more than their fair share of the capital costs 
in relation to the benefits conferred. The amounts required of the Plain-
tiffs are actually less than their fair share of the costs for the needs 
created by the development of thP. Wescall Subdivision. 
11. The fact that there may be other funding methods (such as bonding 
and increasing the property tax mill levy) available to the City to raise 
revenues from which to construct flood-control projects and parks and 
recreation areas, as suggested by the Plaintiffs, does not invalidate the 
impact fee method (under the Ordinance) chosen by the City to pay for the 
costs in solving such needs. These measures for alternative sources of 
revenue ignore the concept of an "impact fee", which has been approved by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
12. The accounting and financial records which have been maintained by 
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the City to account for the impact fees collected under th~ ~1·d1nance are 
and have been maintained in compliance with generally accepted accounting 
principles and the relevant provisions of Utah law perta1n1ng to such 
records. 
13. The Ordinance was valid and promulgated by the governing body of 
the City of West Jordan. It was not shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the City failed to comply with the provisions of Section 10-
9-25, Utah Code Annotated, in the promulgation of the Ordinance. 
14. The fact that the initial studies prepared by the engineering firm 
for the City indicated that the impact fee was to be $300 per acre does not 
render the impact fee actually charged the Plaintiffs in this case to be 
"unreasonable". In this regard, the Court determined that upon the basis 
of the testimony concerning the needs created by the development, together 
with such other factors as inflation and the fact that the engineering study 
only addressed flood control needs and did not take into account parks and 
recreation areas, sustain the reasonableness of the fee. 
15. The putative class is not so numerous that joinder of all party 
is impracticable. 
16. The defenses which could be asserted by the Defendant are not typical 
for all members of the class; specifically, what may be a "reasonable" fee 
for one subdivision may be "unreasonable'' for another, when the specific needs, 
etc. of that latter subdivision are examined. 
17. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class 
would not create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications or 
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ddJudications which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the 
interests of the other members not parties to the action herein. 
18. Questions of law or fact common to the members of the putative 
class do not predominate over questions effecting only individual members. 
19. The Court has considered the extent and nature of any litigation 
concerning the controversy already commenced by other members of the class 
and the Court takes notice that no other action against the City on this 
particular issue have been previously filed. The Court likewise has 
considered the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation 
of claims in the particular forum and has also considered the difficulties 
likely to be encountered in the management of the class action, particularly 
at this late date where certification of the class was sought on the first 
day of trial. The Court finds that no notice could reasonably be given to 
the other class members involved in the controversy and accordingly the 
Court determines that a class action is not superior to other available 
''thod< ''' th• '''' ood •ffici~icotioo of th• coot''''''Y· 
Entered this~ day of , 1983. 
'f);~= 
DAVID B DEE, Judge of the District Court ,,,() : · .. 
I ,~ ... rJ, :) •. ', 
CERTIFICATE ':ff?_'':<'.vs,.,VIJ..U,;v'_ 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing proposed CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to 
Mr Robert DeBry, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 965 E. 4800 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84117 this 14th day of January, 1983. 
i_ _·. \,_-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs 
VS 
JUDGMENT 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Civil No. C-78-829 
Defendant 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court, having heard oral testimony on September lst and 2nd and 
November 18th, 1982 and having fully examined the exhibits received into 
evidence and having heard the arguments of counsel thereon and having been 
fully apprised in all premises herein and having heretofor entered Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED: 
l. The impact fee assessed against and paid by the Plaintiffs is con-
stitutionally reasonable. The impact fee has not been "applied" to the 
Plaintiffs in an impermissable or unconstitutional manner. 
2. The impact fee Ordinance adopted by the City on January 21, 1975 and 
the impact fee assessed and collected thereunder from the Plaintiffs are 
valid. All Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant are dismissed, with 
APPENDIX "D" ~ J__ ; ... ".: 
prejudice, and final judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant. 
3. The Defendant is awarded its costs in defending this action. 
Counsel for the Defendant shall submit to the Court and to counsel for the 
Plaintiffs a written Memorandum of Costs Incurred within 5 days of entry 
of this Judgment. 
Entered this ~day of tit,, 1983. 
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